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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) is now evolving into a loosely coupled, decentralized system of cooperating smart objects, where high-
speed data processing, analytics and shorter response times are becoming more necessary than ever. Such decentralization has
a great impact on the way personal information generated and consumed by smart objects should be protected, because, without
centralized data management, it is more difficult to control how data are combined and used by smart objects. To cope with this
issue, in this paper, we propose a framework where users of smart objects can specify their privacy preferences. Compliance
check of user individual privacy preferences is performed directly by smart objects. Moreover, acknowledging that embedding the
enforcement mechanism into smart objects implies some overhead, we have extensively tested the proposed framework on different
scenarios, and the obtained results show the feasibility of our approach.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Smart Objects, Privacy.
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are revolutionizing our
daily lives [1], building around us a pervasive environment of
smart objects able, not only to sense data, but also to inter-
act with other objects and to aggregate data sensed through
different sensors. This allows smart objects to locally create
new knowledge, that could be used to make decisions, such as
quickly trigger actions on environments, if needed. Smart ob-
jects are very heterogeneous in terms of data sensing and data
processing capabilities. Some of them can only sense data, oth-
ers can perform basic or complex operations on them. Such
a scenario enacts the transition from the Internet of Things to
the Internet of Everything, a new definition of IoT seen as a
loosely coupled, decentralized system of cooperating smart ob-
jects, which leverages on alternative architectural patterns with
regards to the centralized cloud-based one, such as fog comput-
ing. Such a trend towards decentralization reduces the amount
of data that is transferred to the cloud for processing and anal-
ysis, and can also be instrumental to improve security and pri-
vacy of the managed data, a major concern in the IoT scenario.
However, decentralization, if not properly governed, might also
imply loss of control over the data, with consequences on indi-
vidual privacy.
In this paper, we focus on the challenging issue of designing a
decentralized privacy enforcement mechanism, where compli-
ance check of user individual privacy preferences is performed
directly by smart objects, rather than by a central entity. Re-
strictions on devices’ capabilities let us discard existing propos-
als for decentralized access control (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5]), as these
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heavily rely on cryptographic primitives. Previously, in [6], we
addressed the problem of specifying and enforcing privacy pref-
erences in the IoT scenario, but for a centralized architecture,
that is, a scenario where devices have only the capability to
sense data and send them to a data center for being analyzed. In
this setting, the enforcement monitor analyzes every consumer
query and decides if the privacy policy of the consumer satisfies
the privacy preferences specified by owners of devices generat-
ing the data. Compared to this approach, decentralized privacy
enforcement scenario requires to address several new impor-
tant research challenges, as smart objects are characterized by
heterogeneous processing capabilities. To address these chal-
lenges, in this paper, we extend the privacy preference model
proposed in [6], by designing a set of privacy meta-data that
are used by smart objects for locally checking privacy pref-
erences and for locally enforcing user privacy preferences at
smart object level. Smart objects are thus able to derive pri-
vacy meta-data for newly created data items, keep track of the
operations performed over data items, denoted as history, in or-
der to ease privacy preference enforcement, and, finally, check
compliance of the privacy policy of the data consumer with the
privacy preferences of data items. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first work proposing a decentralized enforcement of
privacy preferences able to work locally at smart object level.
Acknowledging that embedding the enforcement mechanism
into smart objects might imply some overhead, we have ex-
tensively tested the proposed framework. In doing the exper-
iments, we have considered several scenarios, by varying the
complexity of the privacy preferences, smart object networks,
and evaluated queries. The experiments allow us to asses the
feasibility of the proposed approach in a variety of application
domains.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
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2 describes the system model and design assumptions of the
proposed privacy preserving framework. Section 3 introduces
the privacy preference model. Section 4 presents the proposed
enforcement mechanism. Experimental results are illustrated in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses related work, whereas Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. System Model and Assumptions
The main purpose of the framework is to enhance the pri-
vacy of IoT users making them able to set and enforce their
privacy preferences. The privacy enforcement mechanism re-
lies on some privacy meta-data (encoding user privacy prefer-
ences, data categories, and data history), generated by smart
objects. Data generated by smart objects are modelled as data
streams. Moreover, we assume that smart objects are able to
perform a set of SQL-like operations (i.e., projection (Π), ag-
gregation (Σ), join (1) and selection (σ)) over data streams, as
SQL represents the query model adopted by many data pro-
cessing systems in the IoT domain [7]. These SQL operators
are continuously evaluated on every incoming tuple, whereas
operations like join and aggregation are processed on groups
of tuples organized as sliding windows. In the following, we
present the system model and our design assumptions.
2.1. System model
We consider a decentralized IoT system consisting of the fol-
lowing entities:
Subjects. We consider two types of subjects, namely data
owners and data consumers. Data owner is the user that owns an
IoT smart object. We assume that data owners define individual
privacy preferences over their data (cfr. Section 3 for a detailed
discussion) in order to control how their data are distributed
and processed. In contrast, data consumer consume raw or pro-
cessed data from IoT systems. We assume that data consumers
adopt privacy practices that specify how the consumer will use
the users’ data.
Smart Objects. Smart objects are able to sense, process and
aggregate data, and interact with other smart objects. However,
they are extremely heterogeneous regarding their capabilities
and roles in the IoT ecosystem and this also impacts the pri-
vacy checks they can perform. In particular, we need to clas-
sify smart objects based on their capabilities so as to assign to
each of them a possible role, and corresponding function in the
proposed decentralized privacy preference enforcement mecha-
nism. On the basis of several standardization recommendations
from different organizations [8, 9], we propose a smart objects
taxonomy based on the object smartness, aka abilities in sens-
ing and processing individual data, as follows:
– First Level of Smartness: at this level, devices have a very
limited capacity, being able only to act as basic sensors, for
sensing data from the environment.
– Second Level of Smartness: at the second level, devices
have a limited capacity and computing power, making them
only able to perform basic operations by their own, like pro-
jection and selection, which do not require window-based pro-
cesses that are working on tuples organized as sliding windows,
such as join or aggregation. These devices might be virtual or
physically manufactured, e.g., a field-programmable gate array
(FPGA) or hard-coded devices.
– Third Level of Smartness: at this level, we group those de-
vices that have enough capacity and computing power for per-
forming complex operations by their own, including window-
based operations.
According to this taxonomy, a smart object (SO) may play
three different roles in the proposed decentralized privacy en-
forcement:1
– Sensing Smart Objects: the main objective of this type of
smart objects is sensing data from the environment. Typically,
a smart object with a first level of smartness will play this role.
– Processor Smart Objects: this type of smart objects aim
at creating new information from sensed data by performing
operations over them. Complexity of these operations depends
on the smartness level of the object. As such, a smart object
with second or third level of smartness will be able to play this
role.
– Consumer Smart Objects: a smart object playing this role is
in charge of verifying user privacy preferences before sending
data to consumers. This process is called privacy preference
compliance (see Section 4.3 for more details). Such role can
be taken by SOs with third level of smartness (e.g., gateway
devices, such as Dell Edge Gateways or HPE Edgeline Gate-
ways).
Example 1 Throughout the paper, we will use as an exam-
ple a smart home system. We assume that the smart home is
equipped with a smart heating and electricity usage control sys-
tems. The smart heating system is built on top of a network
of smart objects able to sense temperature values from several
rooms, adjust temperature, if needed, and share data with the
heating company. The smart electricity usage system relies on
a network of smart objects able to sense electricity usage data,
locally compute usage trends, and send them to the electricity
distribution company (see Figure 1). In this scenario, sensing
smart objects are those devices used for measuring electricity
usage and sensing room temperature, whereas processor smart
objects are those used to locally aggregate data sensed by sens-
ing SOs, with the purpose of generating trends of electricity
usage as well as average rooms temperature. Finally, smart ob-
jects sending collected information to electricity and heating
system companies can be categorized as consumer smart ob-
jects, as their main role is to send data to consumers.
2.2. Security assumptions
Security vulnerabilities, if not properly addressed and pre-
vented, may allow adversaries to damage correct execution of
IoT systems and the proposed privacy preserving mechanism.
In designing the privacy preserving mechanism, we have as-
sumed that smart objects conduct a set of defence strategies to
protect the IoT system from security threats and attacks. Let
1We postpone the reader to Section 4 for details about processes and algorithms
implemented for each role.
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Figure 1: Smart home scenario
us first define the adversary model. We assume that an ad-
versary is capable to block and intercept communication, and
is also able to overhear, inject and delete messages exchanged
between smart objects, as well as analyze communication pat-
terns. Moreover, we assume that sensing and processor SOs are
susceptible to be compromised by adversaries and thus can act
maliciously, whereas consumer SOs are honest, i.e., they be-
have as expected according to the proposed algorithms. This
assumption is based on the conjecture that IoT gateway de-
vices, such as Dell Edge Gateways2, or HPE Edgeline Gate-
ways3 hosting consumer SOs are securely produced by their
manufacturers and have high resources. Indeed, as stated by
[10], a vulnerability in the hardware of such devices will in-
evitably threat the whole system. Therefore, we assume that
device manufactures will do their best in designing secure gate-
way devices. Given the adversary model, the privacy preserving
mechanism relies on the following defense techniques that are
assumed to be conducted by smart objects:
Network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. We
assume that consumer SOs are complemented with network
monitoring (e.g., [11]) and intrusion-detection mechanisms
(e.g., [12]). Because such mechanisms help to detect and re-
duce effects of Denial of Service (DoS) and node compromise
attacks. Indeed, as our approach relies on machine to machine
communication among smart objects in which the operations of
one smart object, e.g., meta-data generation and update, mostly
depend on the data sent by another smart object, DoS attacks
may affect the correct execution of the protocols. Furthermore,
compromised and malicious processor SOs can alter the deriva-
tion of new privacy meta-data with the result of not correctly en-
forcing privacy requirements of the data owners. By virtue of
equipping consumer SOs with intrusion detection mechanisms,
we assume that consumer SOs analyze the network and detect
compromised and infected devices acting maliciously or violat-
ing policies.
Lightweight encryption and authentication mechanisms.
We also assume that all smart objects are equipped with encryp-
tion mechanisms (such as [13, 14]) that make use of lightweight
cryptographic primitives (e.g., hash, nonce, etc), and thus able
2dell.com/us/business/p/edge − gateway
3hpe.com/emeaeurope/en/servers/edgeline − iot − systems
to encrypt the data and the meta-data before sending them. In
such a way, that data cannot be disclosed and privacy meta-data
cannot be compromised during the communication.
We also assume that smart objects are equipped with hop by
hop authentication protocols, such as [15]. This is a a way to
contrast impersonation attacks, where an adversary might aim
to seize the identity of a legitimate smart object, such as access
credentials of the device, to act on behalf of the legitimate de-
vice (e.g. injecting fake data) that may compromising privacy
preference enforcement.
Clone detection protocols. We assume that smart objects
are equipped with a globally aware distributed clone detection
protocol (such as [16]). Cloned smart objects may generate
fake data and affect the correct execution of the privacy pro-
tection protocols, as well as they can be used to disable and
compromise honest smart objects and thus damage privacy en-
forcement.
3. The Privacy Model
In this section, we present the privacy preference model and
an approach to automatically generate privacy preferences for
new generated data.
3.1. Privacy Preferences
Privacy preferences are specified according to the model pro-
posed in [6], which has been designed to cope with two relevant
challenges that IoT ecosystems pose on the management of in-
dividual privacy.
The first is that, due to the complexity of the data flows
among IoT devices, users easily lose the control on how their
data are distributed and processed. This is even made worse
considered that data generated by different IoT devices can be
fused to infer new information on individuals. To give individu-
als more control, we support privacy preferences that are able to
specify additional constraints with regards to those that can be
expressed by standard privacy languages. In particular, our pri-
vacy preferences make a user able to pose conditions not only
on which portion can be collected, for which usage purpose, for
how long, and by whom (like traditional privacy policies and
preferences), but also make him/her able to pose limitations on
how data can be used to derive new information (e.g., by explic-
itly stating what cannot be derived from users data by analytics
processes).
The second issue the privacy model considers is related to
the management of new derived data. Indeed, although privacy
preferences help individuals at regulating the derivation of new
data, they do not regulate how these new data will be managed.
At this purpose, the privacy model implements a strategy for
the automatic definition of additional privacy preferences for
newly derived data. The new preference is defined by taking
into account the privacy preferences associated with each single
piece of data used for computing the new derived data.
Similar to other privacy preference models, we organize both
purposes and data categories into trees. This simplifies the
specification of privacy preferences, in that a preference stated
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for a node in the tree representing a purpose/category (e.g., the
physical state data category) implicitly holds also for all nodes
in its subtree (e.g., heart beat, blood pressure, etc.). More-
over, besides making individual able to specify the purposes for
which is allowed the data usage, the model aims at making him
also able to pose limitation. As such, the privacy preference al-
lows the specification of those purposes for which the access is
explicitly prohibited. This is represented via an element, called
intended purposes – ip, which is modeled as a pair (Aip, Exc),
with the following semantics: all requests with a purpose that
descends from elements in Aip are authorized, except for those
that descend from any element in Exc in the purpose tree.
Besides intended purposes, privacy preferences allow users
to explicitly state which portions of their personal data can be
combined/aggregated with other data. Such requirements are
expressed in terms of allowed/denied data categories, modelled
through the so called joint access constraints – jac. More for-
mally, a joint access constraint for an attribute a is a tuple 〈Adc,
Exc, ip〉, where Adc is the set of data categories that can be
jointly accessed with a, Exc is a set of data categories that
specialize elements in Adc and that cannot be jointly accessed,
whereas ip is an intended purpose. This constraint specifies that
the categories that descend from those specified in Adc can be
jointly accessed with attribute a for the purposes authorized by
ip, except for those that descend from any element in Exc. Fi-
nally, a privacy preference allows data owners to specify what
cannot be derived from their data by the analytics processes.
This is specified through a category derivation constraint – cdc,
that specifies a set of data categories, denoted as Cdc, that can-
not be derived using the data.4
A privacy preference is therefore formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Privacy preference) A privacy preference pp is
a tuple 〈α, consumer, ip, jac, cdc〉, where α is an attribute of
a data stream generated by a smart object, consumer specifies
the set of data consumers authorized to access α, ip specifies
the intended purposes for which α can be collected and used,
jac specifies a joint access constraint, whereas cdc is category
derivation constraint specifying a set of data categories which
cannot be derived from α.
A summary of the notations related to privacy preferences is
given in Table 1.
Element Abbreviation
Consumer ids consumer
Intended Purpose ip
Allowed intended purposes of ip ip.Aip
Prohibited intended purposes of ip ip.Exc
Joint access constraint jac
Allowed data categories of jac jac.Adc
Prohibited data categories of jac jac.Exc
Intended purposes for jac jac.ip
Category derivation constraint cdc
Table 1: Privacy preference’s notation
4In what follows, we will use the dot notation to refer to specific components
of jac and ip elements.
Example 2 Let us consider the smart home scenario given
in Example 1 and let us suppose that a user, say Charlotte, has
installed this smart home system in her apartment and that she
wants to specify a privacy preference pp for the temperature
data sensed by the system. In particular, Charlotte wants to
share her data only with Smart Home Company and she wants
to release the sensed data only for the administration of the heat-
ing system. Moreover, she allows temperature data to be joined
with generic information, as well as health data of her smart
watch (e.g., body temperature) as this could help her to prop-
erly customize room temperature. Thus, she agrees that temper-
ature data is joined with generic information and health data for
administration purpose. However, she prefers that from these
data it is not possible to derive sensitive information, such as
her current location in the apartment or the number of persons
in the room. To model these requirements, Charlotte can spec-
ify pp as: 〈temperature, {smart-home-company}, 〈{admin}, ∅〉,
〈{generic, health},∅, 〈{admin},∅〉〉, {sensitive}〉.
As a final note, it is important to highlight that the addi-
tional elements that we have introduced to cope with the new
issues that IoT scenario poses, (i.e., consumer identities, joint
access constraints, and category derivation constraints), are
not mandatory. This provides flexibility to vendors to decide
whether to adhere only to common privacy practices (e.g., sup-
porting privacy preferences with purpose, retention, and third
party elements) or to exploit the extended privacy preferences
so as to provide users with a more complete control on their
personal data.
3.2. Privacy Preference Derivation
An interesting feature of the model in [6] is its ability to as-
sociate privacy preferences with new data generated by smart
objects. These new privacy preferences are defined by combin-
ing the privacy preferences specified by each owner of smart
objects sensing the data involved in the derivation process. Pri-
vacy preferences are combined by taking the most conservative
approach so that the resulting privacy preference satisfies the
constraints specified in all the privacy preferences associated
with smart objects involved in the data fusion process. More
precisely, the composed privacy preference is defined by taking
the intersection of the consumer, jac.Adc and ip.Aip elements,
and the union of the jac.Exc, ip.Exc and cdc fields of the pri-
vacy preferences involved in data fusion. Formally a composed
privacy preference is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Composed privacy preference) Let α be an at-
tribute belonging to the output stream generated by a smart ob-
ject, and let At be the set of attributes from which α is derived.
The privacy preference pp = 〈α, consumer, ip, jac, cdc〉 for α is
derived as follows:
• consumer is defined as the intersection of the ids in
the consumer field with all privacy preferences asso-
ciated to all attributes in At, that is: consumer =⋂
a∈At a.pp.consumer
• The intended purpose component ip is defined as:
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– Aip (allowed intended purposes) is the intersection of the
purposes implied by the ip’s allowed intended purposes of
all attributes in At, that is: Aip =
⋂
a∈At
⋃
p∈a.pp.ip.Aip p↓,
where p↓ denotes a set composed of p and all purposes
descending from p in the purpose tree.
– Exc (prohibited purposes) is the union of the ip’s prohib-
ited purposes of the privacy preferences specified for At’s
attributes, that is: Exc =
⋃
a∈At a.pp.ip.Exc
• The joint access constraint jac is defined as: – Adc (al-
lowed data categories) is the intersection of the jac’s al-
lowed data categories of all attributes in At, that is: Adc =⋂
a∈At
⋃
c∈a.pp. jac.Adc c↓, where c↓ denotes the set composed
of c and all categories that descend from c in the data cat-
egory tree.
– Exc (exception) is the union of the jac’s exceptions spec-
ified for all attributes in At, that is:
Exc=
⋃
a∈At a.pp. jac.Exc;
– ip (jac intended purposes) is defined following the
same criteria of the preference intended purposes, that
is: ip.Aip=
⋂
a∈At
⋃
p∈a.pp. jac.ip.Aip p↓, and ip.Exc =⋃
a∈At a.pp. jac.ip.Exc.
• The prohibited data categories cdc are defined as the
union of prohibited data categories specified in the pri-
vacy preferences of all attributes in At, that is: cdc =⋃
a∈At a.pp.cdc
Example 3 Let us consider the privacy preference de-
scribed in Example 2 and let us further suppose that Char-
lotte also wants to specify a privacy preference for the elec-
tricity usage data. In particular, Charlotte wants to share her
data with the Electricity Company and the Smart Home Com-
pany. Moreover, she wishes to: i) release the sensed data only
for the administration of the electricity usage system, and ii) to
join them with generic information for administration purpose,
whereas iii) she does not pose any condition on what can’t be
derived from her data. Thus, she also specifies the following
privacy preference: 〈electricityUsage, {smart-home-company,
electricity-company}, 〈{admin},∅〉, 〈{generic},∅, 〈{admin}, ∅〉〉,
∅〉.
Let us assume that the smart home network executes an equi-
join on streams containing the electricity usage and tempera-
ture data generated by Charlotte’s smart home system on idroom
attributes, which we assume to have in both the two streams.
Moreover, we assume that idroom has associated the same pri-
vacy preferences of temperature and electricity usage in both
streams. The composed privacy preference for idroom in the
stream containing temperature data is:
〈idroom, {smart-home-company}, 〈{admin}, ∅〉, 〈{generic}, ∅,
〈{admin}, ∅〉〉, {sensitive}〉.
This new privacy preference states that information on idroom
can be released only for administration purpose to the Smart
Home Company, can be joined with generic data for administra-
tion purpose, whereas sensitive information cannot be derived
from this data.
4. Decentralized privacy preference enforcement
In order to assure that user privacy preferences are taken into
consideration during data usage and processing, there is the
need of an enforcement mechanism whose primary goal is to
verify whether the privacy practices adopted by the entity wish-
ing to consume the data, aka the consumer, satisfies data own-
ers’ privacy preferences. To make this compliance check auto-
matic, we assume that consumer privacy practices are encoded
into privacy policies, that is, a set of statements on how the con-
sumer will use the users’ data. Typically, a privacy policy spec-
ifies: the consumer identity (id), data attributes that consumer
wishes to consume, purpose of the data usage, release of the
data to third-parties and retention of the data in the consumer
information system.5 In what follows, we focus on the pur-
pose and consumer id components of a privacy policy/prefer-
ence and the related checks, in that they are the most important
information used by the enforcement monitor. The enforcement
mechanism has to verify whether the declared purpose of data
usage and id of the consumer in the consumer’s privacy policy
is compliant with the privacy preferences specified by the users
owning the smart object devices generating the data.
We handle compliance check through an aposteriori ap-
proach, that is, we perform compliance check only when data
are going to be shared with consumers. The main motivation
is that leaving compliance check to consumer SOs increases
the possibility for data to be processed and thus to be even-
tually consumed according to user privacy preferences. For
instance, let us consider the equi-join operation performed in
Example 3. Let us assume that Charlotte’s privacy preferences
for electricity usage data only allow joint access with position
data (e.g., coordinates of the individual), and let us also assume
that joined streams have further attributes, in addition to elec-
tricity usage and temperature data. In such case, the equi-join
operation in Example 3 is not compliant with Charlotte’s pri-
vacy preferences. Performing a compliance check at this point
would prevent to generate the joined stream, and further data
flows would be cut. In contrast, by an aposteriori compliance
check approach attributes in the joined streams can be further
processed in the smart object network and consumers can con-
sume the data that would not violate the privacy preferences of
the users.
Figure 2: Privacy enforcement by SO roles
In order to push privacy preference enforcement at object
level, we have to first complement the processed data with pri-
vacy meta-data that specify, for each piece of sensed or newly
5Privacy policies can be specified, as an example, by using XACML
(https://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/privacy/v1.0/xacml-3.0-privacy-
v1.0.html)
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created data, all information needed to enforce privacy prefer-
ences (see Figure 2). As an example, the sensing smart objects
have to be able to associate with each piece of sensed data the
corresponding privacy preferences specified by object owners.
Moreover, processor SOs have to be able to locally generate
additional privacy preferences for the newly created or modi-
fied data. This process requires to make processor SOs aware
of how the new data have been created (e.g., which are the op-
erations, the input data involved in the operations, as well as,
the corresponding privacy preferences). Finally, smart objects
playing the role of consumer SOs have to be able to locally per-
form compliance check.
4.1. Privacy meta-data
To model additional privacy information, we need to add,
for each attribute contained into the original schema, three ad-
ditional attributes, namely category, pp (privacy preferences),
and history.
Let us start discussing the category attribute. The category
associated with an attribute is not a static information, as data
associated with an attribute might be fused with other infor-
mation, or simply modified, with the result of a change of its
content and thus of its associated data categories. To cope with
these dynamic aspects, we need to trace, for each attribute, its
updated set of data categories, based on its current content. Sec-
ondly, in order to make a consumer SO able to perform privacy
preference enforcement, it has to know the privacy preferences
associated with each attribute. Such information is encoded in
the additional pp attribute. Moreover, information about every
operation performed on data has to be documented alongside
the data itself. Indeed, by design, compliance check is only per-
formed by consumer SOs, just before data are sent to the con-
sumer (see Figure 2). Processor SOs are only in charge of exe-
cuting data processing and privacy meta-data generation, with-
out caring about compliance checks. As such, it might be pos-
sible that in a smart object network, a processor SO performs
an operation, e.g., a join, that breaks a jac or cdc condition.
In order to make a consumer SO able to verify if operations
performed by all processor SOs satisfy jac and cdc constraints,
it has to know all operations performed on each piece of data
(aka each attribute). At this purpose, we introduce, for each at-
tribute in the stream schema, a new attribute, denoted as history,
which contains a list of history entries, one for each operation
performed on the corresponding attribute.
This privacy meta-data are directly encoded into the origi-
nal data stream schema, obtaining thus a new schema, called
Privacy-Enhanced Attribute Schema (PEAS), formally defined
as follows:
Definition 3. (Privacy-Enhanced Attribute Schema). Let
S =(A1, . . . , An) be the schema of a data stream, where
A1, . . . ,An are the data stream attributes. The Privacy-
Enhanced Attribute Schema of S is defined as S =(A1, . . . ,An),
such that A j= (A j, pp, category, history), ∀ j ∈ 1, . . . , n, where:
• pp is the privacy preference associated with attribute A j,
as defined in Definition 1;
• category is the set of data categories associated with the
current value of attribute A j;
• history is a list {HE1,. . . ,HEm}, containing an element for
each operator Op, A j has undergone so far. HEi=(ACi,
RCi), for ∀i ∈ 1, . . . ,m, where:
– ACi is the set of categories associated with attributes on
which Op is executed for deriving A j;
– RC j is the set of data categories associated with A j after
the execution of Op;
As depicted in Figure 2, privacy meta-data are initialized by
sensing SOs, which collect the raw data and generate the cor-
responding PEAS schemas. In particular, at this stage in the
PEAS schema the history field is initialized as empty, whereas
the pp and category fields contain privacy preferences and
associated data category information defined by smart object
owners. Processor SOs also modify attributes of PEAS schema.
In particular, as it will be discussed in Section 4.2, for each pro-
cessed attribute, they have to update the category field, based
on current value of the corresponding attribute as well as the
history field.
Example 4 Let us refer again to Example 2, and, in
particular, to attribute att containing the temperature data of
Charlotte’s smart home. Recalling the privacy preferences in
Example 2, and supposing that the current temperature is 24.4
Celsius degree, the initial PEAS generated by the sensing SO,
is the following:
– att = {24.4},
– att.pp = 〈temperature, {smart-home-company}, 〈{admin},
∅〉, 〈{generic, health}, ∅, 〈{admin}, ∅〉〉, {sensitive}〉,
– att.category = {generic},
– att.history = {∅}.
4.2. PEAS generation
For each sensed data, the sensing SO has to initialize the
proper PEAS, with the privacy preferences specified by sensing
SO’s owner, the initial data category of the sensed data, and an
empty history field. Additionally, after each operation, proces-
sor SOs should derive the privacy preferences of the eventually
newly created attribute content, as well as update the category
and history fields of each attribute involved in the operation.
Hence, we assume that processor SOs are complemented with
additional logic, implementing PEAS update.
Since PEAS generation in sensing SOs is quite straightfor-
ward, in that it mainly consists in initializing pp and category
attributes with predefined values, in the following we focus on
PEAS update algorithms. PEAS update is mainly driven by the
operations performed by processor SOs. As such, we define
algorithms for all query operators except for the selection oper-
ator, as, by definition, this operator does not generate any new
data, as such, no modification of the PEAS is needed. The al-
gorithm receives as input the performed SQL operator Op (e.g.,
avg, sum, ×, etc.) and input streams, used by the corresponding
operation. In particular, we model an SQL operator based on
operations it performs on the attributes. For example, the join
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of streams S 1(a, b, c) and S 2(a, d, e) on attribute a is modelled
as two parameters: {join, (S1.a, S2.a)}, that is, the involved at-
tributes and the performed operation. Since, an SQL operator
Op might perform more than one operation (see, for instance,
the Π operator in the following Example 5), we formally define
Op as a set {Pa1,. . . ,Pal}, where every Pai models a single op-
eration. As such, Pai= {Attributes, f n}, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, where
Attributes is a set of attributes given as input to function f n
when operation Pai is executed.
Example 5 Suppose that the stream resulting from the
equi-join operation illustrated in Example 3 also contains hu-
midity data, thus resulting in S(temperature, electricityUsage,
humidity). Let us assume to perform on this joined stream a
projection Π1 computing two values: the first obtained as mul-
tiplication of temperature and electricityUsage to estimate the
number of people in the smart home,6 and the second as ex-
ecution of f () that takes as input temperature and humidity
and returns the air-quality information. Π1 is thus modeled as:
Π1 = {Pa1, Pa2}, where Pa1= {{temperature, electricityUsage},
×} and Pa2= {{temperature, humidity}, f ()}.
PEAS generation algorithm exploits function derivePP(),
that derives new composed privacy preferences, and function
createHistoryEntry(), which creates a new history entry, based
on the parameters of the performed operation. Finally, func-
tion deriveDC() determines the category of the new generated
data given in input. To implement such a function, we assume
the presence of a set of inference rules, called derivation paths.
Each derivation path associates with a query operator and the
set of categories of the data on which the operator is executed,
the category of the data resulting from the operator execution.
We therefore assume that derivation paths are present in ev-
ery processor SO, so derived data category can be locally com-
puted.
Example 6 Let us give an example of derivation path, by
referring to the smart home scenario illustrated in Figure 1
and by assuming that also humidity information can be sensed.
The derivation path dp1= 〈{temperature,electricityUsage}, ×,
Π , sensitive 〉, specifies that the knowledge of temperature
and electricity usage allows, through the Π and × operators,
the derivation of the number of people inside the smart home.
In contrast, the derivation path dp2= 〈{temperature,humidity},
f (), Π, air-quality 〉 specifies that the knowledge of temperature
and humidity usage allows derivation of air quality information,
through operator Π and function f ().
For PEAS derivation, Algorithm 1 takes as input tuples s1
and s2 (if operation is not 1 then s2 will be empty), and pa-
rameters modeling operation Π, Σ or 1. The algorithm returns
an updated tuple, containing new attribute(s) generated by ex-
ecution of the corresponding operation given in input and con-
taining the updated pp, category and history fields associated
with each attribute involved in the operation. In performing
PEAS update for 1 operation, attributes of tuples s1, s2 not
used by 1 remain unchanged, and by the nature of Σ (such
6For simplicity, we assume that this is possible by multiplying electricity and
temperature usage.
as avg(), sum(), etc.), only one parameter will be present in
Op.Parameters. The algorithm exploits previously discussed
functions: derivePP() and createHistoryEntry().
Algorithm 1: PEAS Derivation(Op, s1, s2)
1 Let snew be a new stream, initialized with an empty schema;
2 Let re f AttS et be the set of attributes, initialized to be empty;
3 if Op = Σ or pi then
4 for each Pa ∈ Op.Parameters do
5 Let attnew be an attribute, initialized to be empty;
6 Let newData be the result of operation Pa;
7 re f AttS et = Pa.Attributes;
8 attnew.name = Pa.name;
9 attnew.data = newData;
10 attnew.category = deriveDC(Op, re f AttS et);
11 attnew.PP = derivePP(Op, re f AttS et);
12 attnew.History =
⋃
att∈re f AttS et att.History
⋃
createHistoryEntry(
⋃
a∈re f AttS et a.Category, att.category);
13 snew.Attributes = snew.Attributes ∪ attnew;
14 else if Op = 1 then
15 Let Op.Parameters={a1, a2} be the two attributes used in the Join
statement;
16 Let s1.Attributes and s2.Attributes be the set of attributes contained in s1
and s2 schema, respectively;
17 Let attributeS et be a set of attributes, initialized to be empty;
18 re f AttS et = a1 ∪ a2;
19 attributeS et = s1.Attributes ∪ s2.Attributes \ re f AttS et;
20 a1,2.PP = derivePP(Op, re f AttS et)
21 a1,2.History = a2.History
⋃
createHistoryEntry(re f AttS et.category,
a1.category | a2.category );
22 snew.Attributes = attributeS et
⋃
re f AttS et;
23 Return 〈snew〉;
For snew and attnew, dot notation is used in accessing their elements specified
by Definition 3.
Example 7 Let us give an example of PEAS derivation by
Algorithm 1 for the join of temperature and electricity usage
data described in Example 3. Let us assume that the PEAS of
electricity usage data has been created with the same logic given
in Example 4. First, Algorithm 1 stores the parameters used
in the join operation into refAttSet. All attributes of the two
streams except parameters used in the join operation are stored
as attributeSet to be included in the resulting stream without
any modification. Then, the algorithm performs composition
of privacy preferences for attributes in refAttSet and updates
attributes in refAttSet with newly derived privacy preferences.
Then, the new history entry newHE is created by function cre-
ateHistoryEntry(), and added to the history fields of both the at-
tributes used as parameters in the operation. Finally, the union
of the attributes used as parameters of the operation and at-
tributeSet are added to the resulting stream. The updated PEAS
for the temperature attribute is therefore:
– att = {24.4},
– att.pp = 〈temperature, {smart-home-company}, 〈{admin},
∅〉, 〈{generic}, ∅, 〈{admin}, ∅〉〉, {sensitive}〉,
– att.category = {generic},
– att.history = {{generic, generic}, {generic}}.
4.3. Compliance verification
Compliance verification is the operation of verifying if con-
straints specified by data privacy preferences are satisfied by the
privacy policy of the consumer. These checks are performed by
consumer SOs on every piece of data passing through them.
More formally, a consumer SO receives as input a stream S and
returns as output a stream S , containing only those tuples whose
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attributes’ values satisfy privacy preferences of all the owners
involved in the generation of attributes’ contents. Compliance
check implies three main steps: (i) checking compliance of the
consumer’s identity (i.e., consumerID) with the allowed con-
sumers (i.e., consumer) specified in the data privacy preference;
(ii) checking compliance of the purpose (i.e., ap) of the con-
sumer with the intended purposes (i.e., ip) specified in the data
privacy preference; and (iii) checking compliance of the oper-
ations performed on the data (e.g., on each single attribute of
the input stream) with constraints imposed by the joint access
constraint jac and the category derivation constraint cdc.
Step (i) is straightforward in that it should only be checked
that consumerID specifies the identity of a consumer allowed
to consume attribute A, that is, consumerID ∈ A.pp.consumer.
Regarding step (ii), this check is satisfied if ap specifies an al-
lowed purpose, that is, a purpose contained in ip or in the set
of allowed purposes implied by ip, if purposes are organized
into a tree. More formally, denoting with ~ip the set of purposes
implied by ip, ap complies with ip iff ap ∈ A.pp. ~ip.
For step (iii), let us first discuss compliance of joint ac-
cess constraint jac for a given attribute A with privacy prefer-
ence pp. Jac states which portions of user’s personal data can
be combined/aggregated with other data, and with which con-
sumer purpose, as described in Section 3. The set of categories
implied by jac denoted as ~jac, is composed of all categories
that descend from the categories in jac.Adc which do not de-
scend from any category of jac.Exc. We say that the jac of
attribute A is satisfied iff: (i) all the accessed data categories
in every history entry of A belong to the set of categories im-
plied by ~jac, and (ii) ap complies with the intended purpose
component of jac. Formally:
Definition 4. Jac compliance. Let pp be a privacy preference
specified for attribute A. Compliance of the pp. jac component
is satisfied iff: ap ∈ jac. ~ip ∧ ∀HE∈ A.history, ∀c ∈HE. ~AC →
c ∈ A.pp. ~jac.
Let us now discuss compliance of category derivation con-
straint cdc for a given attribute A with privacy preference pp,
which specifies the data categories that cannot be derived from
the processing of attribute A. The set of data categories which
on the basis of cdc cannot be derived denoted as ~cdc, is com-
posed of all categories that specialize those referred to within
cdc. Similarly to what happened for the jac component, his-
tory of the resulting attribute must be checked, since derivation
of new attributes may be performed several times, and every
derivation process has to comply with privacy preferences of
the attribute. Therefore, we say that cdc of attribute A is satis-
fied iff all the data categories in every history entry of A does
not belong to the set of categories implied by ~cdc. Formally:
Definition 5. Cdc compliance. Let pp be a privacy preferences
specified for attribute A. Compliance of pp.cdc is satisfied iff:
∀HE∈ A.history, @c ∈HE. ~RC ∧ c ∈ A.pp. ~cdc.
Consumer SOs perform compliance check for any attribute
in every tuple before sharing it with consumer. Let us present
and describe our algorithm for checking compliance. As pre-
viously discussed, jac and cdc compliance have to be ensured
for every entry in the history field of PEAS. Algorithm 2 takes
as input a tuple s, the id of the consumer consumerID, and
the access purpose of the consumer ap. The algorithm returns
an updated tuple, containing attribute(s) that complies with the
privacy preferences of the involved users and access purpose of
the consumer.
Algorithm 2: complianceCheck(s, consumerID, ap)
1 Let snew be a stream, initialized as empty;
2 for each A ∈ S do
3 Let cdcFlag and jacFlag be boolean variables, initialized as true;
4 Let ipFlag and jacI pFlag be boolean variables, initialized as false;
5 if (consumerID ∈ A.pp.consumer) then
6 if (ap ∈ A.pp. ~ip) then
7 ipFlag = true;
8 if (ap ∈ A.pp. jac. ~ip) then
9 jacI pFlag = true;
10 for each HE ∈ A.History do
11 Let accessedCategories = HE.AC;
12 Let resultCategories = HE.RC;
13 Let jacDataFlag be a boolean variable, initialized as true;
14 for each cat ∈ accessedCategories do
15 Let f lag be a boolean variable, initialized as false;
16 if cat ∈ A.pp. ~jac then
17 f lag = true;
18 jacDataFlag = jacDataFlag ∧ f lag;
19 for each cat2 ∈ resultCategories do
20 Let f lag2 be a boolean variable, initialized as true;
21 if cat2 ⊆ A.pp. ~cdc then
22 f lag2 = false;
23 cdcFlag=cdcFlag ∧ f lag2;
24 jacFlag = jacDataFlag∧jacIpFlag;
25 if jacFlag=true
∧
cdcFlag=true
∧
ipFlag=true then
26 S new = S new
⋃
A;
27 Return 〈 S new 〉;
For snew and attnew, dot notation is used in accessing their elements specified
by Definition 3.
Example 8 Let us suppose that a processor SO performs
the equi-join and projection Π1 given in Example 7. Moreover,
suppose to have the derivation paths presented in Example 6.
Algorithm 2 first checks compliance of the consumer (line
5). Let us assume that the consumer entity is smart-home-
company. In this case, the check returns true. Then,
Algorithm 2 checks compliance of peopleCount.pp.ip and
peopleCount.pp.jac.ip with the given consumer access pur-
pose ap (lines 6 and 8). Let us assume that the consumer
has specified admin as access purpose. In this case, the
check returns true as both the purposes are admin, hence
ipFlag and jacIpFlag are set to true. Then, for both jac
and cdc, Algorithm 2 checks compliance of every history en-
try HE. Since peopleCount.history has two elements, the
check is performed twice (line 10). In both of them, the al-
gorithm checks that every category cat in HE.AC belongs to
peopleCount.pp. ~jac (line 16). In our example, as people-
Count.pp.jac allows joint access with data belonging to cat-
egory generic, jacDataFlag will remain true for both of the
history entries of peopleCount.History. In the next step, the
logical conjunction of jacDataFlag and jacIpFlag is done, to
get jacFlag. Since both of them are true, jacFlag will be
true. Similarly, the algorithm checks that every category cat2 in
HE.RC does not belong to peopleCount.pp. ~cdc (line 21). For
the first history entry, cdcFlag will remain true, as category in
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HE.RC is not sensitive. For the second history entry, cdcFlag
will change to false, since the category in HE.RC is sensitive.
Finally, since cdcFlag is false (line 25), attribute peopleCount
is not added to the final schema, hence it will not be shared with
the consumer.
5. Experiments
In order to evaluate the overhead of the proposed mechanism,
we have implemented several scenarios introduced in what fol-
lows.
5.1. Experimental scenarios
We developed four experimental scenarios to estimate the
overhead at smart object and at network level.
5.1.1. Processor Smart Objects I
In this scenario, we consider processor SOs of second smart-
ness level, able only to perform data selection and projection. In
particular, we assume that processor SOs I are physically manu-
factured low capability devices, with hard-coded logic.To simu-
late this low capability devices, we have implemented smart ob-
jects using Freescale FRDM-K64F7 with mbed operating sys-
tem.8 This device has 256 KB RAM and ARM Cortex-M4 core.
Coding has been done using C++. Due to limited capabilities
of the FRDM platform, we were not able to use real world data.
As such, in this scenario, we used synthetic data, randomly cre-
ated on the FRDM platform. We generate a tuple per second,
containing a unique attribute of float data type, with randomly
assigned value.
5.1.2. Processor Smart Objects II
In this scenario, we assume that the processor SO is a de-
vice with third smartness level, able to perform, in addition to
selection and projection operations, also window-based opera-
tions, such as join and aggregation. This processor SO II has
been implemented on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B with Raspbian
operating system, with 1GB RAM and a 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-
core ARMv8 CPU. The implementation has been done with
Java SE Development Kit 8u73. Moreover, to implement into
processor SOs II an SQL engine able to manage window-based
operations, we exploit Esper.9 We make use of the IoT-Lab
testbed10 data, which provides a very large scale infrastructure
suitable for testing small wireless sensor devices and heteroge-
neous communicating objects. Each node of IoT-Lab testbed
produces tuples containing a unique attribute containing data
sensed by that node. In particular, IoT-Lab provides three hard-
ware platforms: WSN430, M3 Nodes, and A8 Nodes. Our ex-
periments have been run with data transferred from M3 Nodes,
where lumen level data, represented as float values, are sensed
from light-to-digital sensor ISL29020.11
7developer.mbed.org/platforms/FRDM-K64F/
8www.mbed.com/en/platform/mbed-os/
9www.espertech.com/esper
10www.iot-lab.info
11www.digikey.com/catalog/en/partgroup/isl29020/14151
5.1.3. Consumer Smart Objects
We implemented a smart object with third smartness level,
able to check privacy preference compliance. We adopt the
same simulation and data generation strategies used for proces-
sor SOs II (see Section 5.1.2), where compliance verification
algorithm has been implemented as an additional Java function.
5.1.4. Smart Objects network
We recall that the aim of this experiment is to measure the
overall time overhead and bandwidth utilization implied by our
enforcement mechanism on a network of smart objects. To
simulate this scenario, we should implement a real network of
smart objects, where each object is modified so as to embed
the PEAS update algorithm as well as the compliance checks.
However, the lack of standard platforms on which injecting our
modified smart objects makes hard to deploy this setting. To
overcome this issue, we decided to simulate a network of smart
objects by leveraging on Complex Event Processing (CEP) sys-
tems [17]. We exploit the graph-based SQL modelling of CEP
to simulate a network of objects, where every single operation
in the CEP query is interpreted as a distinct smart object. As
an example, the graph-based SQL query in Figure 3 can be in-
terpreted as a network of two sensing SOs (i.e., the two INPUT
operators), four processor SOs (i.e., the join, projection, aggre-
gation and selection operators), and one final OUTPUT opera-
tor.
Figure 3: Graph-based SQL query
We adopted Streambase as CEP platform, as this product al-
lows us to associate with an SQL operator an additional func-
tion, running a Java code, that will be executed by Streambase
every time the operator processes an incoming tuple. As such,
with Java SE Development Kit 8u73, we defined a set of func-
tions implementing the PEAS update algorithms (cfr. Section
4). These functions have been properly associated with IN-
PUT, Join, Selection, Projection, and Aggregation operators of
Streambase. Following this design, the compliance verification
algorithm should have been associated on the OUTPUT oper-
ator. However, since Streambase does not allow this, we im-
plemented a new Streambase operator, to which the function
implementing the compliance verification algorithm has been
associated. This new defined operator is inserted just before
the OUTPUT operator finalizing the query. We have exploited
the feed simulation tool from Streambase Studio, that automat-
ically generates and passes test data at specified rates to INPUT
operators. Data rate has been fixed to 100 tuples per second for
each stream. Number of attributes in each tuple has been regu-
lated according to experiment settings (see discussion on query
complexity in Section 5.2.1).
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Tested Proc. Proc. Consumer Smart
dimensions SO I SO II SO Object
network
Varying
complexity X X X X
of PP
Varying
query X X X X *
complexity
Varying
number of X X
sensing SOs
Table 2: Experiments: X - time overhead,X * time and bandwidth overhead
5.2. Experimental results
In executing our experiments, we considered three main
characteristics that may impact the performance of the proposed
solution. These are: privacy preferences complexity, queries
complexity, and number of sensing smart objects. However, it
was not possible to test all these dimensions in each scenario
(see Table 5.2). Indeed, the experiment varying the number of
sensing SOs requires to use IoT-Lab dataset, and, as discussed
in Section 5.1, this dataset has been used only for processor SO
II and consumer SO. Experiments have been executed by vary-
ing a single dimension and keeping fixed the others with worst
case settings. Table presents a summary of conducted experi-
ments. In the following, we illustrate the results.
5.2.1. Varying the query complexity
Processor SO I: these SOs are only able to perform σ and
Π operators. Moreover, since σ operator does not alter PEAS
meta-data of processed attributes (cfr. Section 4), we only con-
sidered the Π operator. We varied query complexity by increas-
ing the number of attributes to be evaluated to perform the Π
operator. We recall that, according to the adopted notation, the
Π operator is modeled as a set of parameters, each one having
a set of attributes to be evaluated. Thus, in this experiment, we
have considered a Π operator with a fixed number of parameters
(i.e., 3), by varying the number of attributes in each of them. As
an example, the simplest query is defined as a Π operator with
three parameters and two attributes for each parameter. Given a
stream S(a,b,c), an example of simplest query is Π(a+b),(c−b),(a×c).
Execution times of queries with different complexity levels with
and without the proposed privacy preference enforcement are il-
lustrated in Figure 4. Even for the most complex queries, time
overhead is less than 0.1 ms and performance overhead is less
than 7%.
Figure 4: Varying the query complexity - Processor SO I
Processor SO II: query complexity can be estimated by the
number of operators it contains. However, we have also to take
into account that smart objects are constrained devices, so not
being able to perform too complex SQL-like queries like those
done by DBMSs. For instance, the processor SO II has been
simulated on Raspberry Pi with only 1 GB RAM. To cope with
this limitation, we have considered two sets of queries, with
different complexity. The first set, named Simple Queries, con-
tains queries consisting only of a Σ operator. We select this ag-
gregation operation as we expect it is the most common task
performed by smart objects, that is, aggregating data sensed
by sensors. The second set, named Complex Queries, contains
queries performing a join of data sensed by two clusters of sens-
ing SOs, then a projection over joined attributes, and, finally,
an aggregation (i.e., average on 10s window) on projected val-
ues. Again this type of queries represents a typical operation
for smart objects. Table 3 shows query execution time with
and without privacy preference enforcement. Even for the most
complex queries, the time overhead is less than 0.71 ms and
performance overhead is less than 9%.
Processor Without Proposed
SO II PP enforcement mechanism
Simple 5 ms 5.36 ms
Queries
Complex 8 ms 8.71 ms
Queries
Table 3: Varying query complexity - Processor SO II
Consumer SO: even if consumer SOs are not designed to
perform queries, but only compliance verification, we have to
note that query complexity might impact the execution of this
verification. Indeed, the more complex is the query, the more
operations it contains. Thus, a complex query implies, as a
consequence, more complex History fields to be evaluated by
the compliance verification algorithm. As such, the aim of this
experiment is to estimate how query complexity impacts the
overhead given by compliance check. For this experiment, we
used the same queries generated for processor SO II. Results
of experiments are illustrated in Table 4. Even for complex
queries, the time overhead is less than 0.44 ms.
Scenario Simple Complex
queries queries
Consumer SO II 0.18 ms 0.44 ms
Table 4: Varying query complexity - Consumer SO
Smart Object network: We simulate a smart object network
via a Streambase query, where each single Streambase operator
acts as a smart object. Thus, increasing query complexity is like
increasing the network complexity. In performing these exper-
iments, we use a set of 10 queries with different numbers and
types of operators. In particular, the simplest query, Q1, con-
tains 1 pi, 1 σ, 1 1, and 1 Σ operator, whereas the most complex
query, Q10, contains 10 pi, 10 σ, 10 1, and 10 Σ operators. Re-
sults of experiments are illustrated in Figure 5. As expected,
less complex queries take less time to be processed. However,
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Queries Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
Query selectivity 3,5% 1,84% 0,85% 0,72% 0,55% 0,37% 0,28% 0,2% 0,15% 0,13%
Extra bits per output tuple 98 140 210 245 294 336 392 455 483 546
Bandwidth overload per hour 3440 2576 1785 1764 1617 1243 1097 910 724 709
Table 5: Varying query complexity - SO network - bandwidth overhead
even in complex network scenarios, the system overhead is al-
ways less than 10% which is less than 12 ms.
Figure 5: Varying query complexity - SO network - time overhead
Regarding bandwidth utilization, we have to note that the
overhead is mainly implied by meta-data inserted in the original
tuples. We recall that these meta-data are generated and updated
by each single operator specified in the query. As such, we ex-
pect that a dimension impacting the bandwidth utilization is the
query complexity. In addition to query complexity, another el-
ement that might impact this overhead is the query selectivity,
that can be measured as the ratio of the number of tuples enter-
ing and number of tuples returned to/from a query. As query
selectivity depends on characteristics of query operators (as an
example, in the aggregation operator a bigger window size im-
plies an higher query selectivity), we have modified the bench-
mark of 10 queries above described so as to tune the operators
(e.g., window size in aggregation, selection conditions in Π) to
obtain an increasing selectivity.
Number of bits added into output tuple after query execution
are illustrated in the second line of Table 5. As expected, more
complex queries increase the number of bits added to the meta-
data. However, it is relevant to note that even the most complex
query consumes quite low bandwidth, 0.546 kbits, compared to
the network capabilities of devices running similar queries (like
Raspberry Pi).12
In addition to that, we want to underline that we expect that
complex queries will have higher selectivity over input tuples
(see first line of Table 5), thus less output tuples will be gener-
ated. Thus, on the one hand a more complex query increases
the number of added bits, but on the other hand, it decreases the
number of output tuples and thus the overall bandwidth utiliza-
tion. To better explain this balance, we run an experiment sim-
ulating a smart home scenario generating 1,000 tuples per hour,
each containing a float data type attribute (e.g., room tempera-
ture, used electricity in kw). This implies 32 bits in each single
12www.pidramble.com/wiki/benchmarks/networking
tuple. In case that no queries are executed, that is, all tuples are
flooding the network, we have 32 kbit overall bandwidth per
hour. From the third line of Table 5, we can see that the over-
all overhead decreases by varying query complexity, aka query
selectivity. Therefore, even in the worst case, output tuples gen-
erated by queries consume quite low bandwidth, i.e. 3.4 kbits.
5.2.2. Varying complexity of privacy preferences
We recall that a privacy preference poses a set of conditions
to be verified on consumer privacy policy, namely ip, jac, and
cdc (see Section 3). The presence of these conditions implies
checks and operations both in the compliance verification algo-
rithm as well as in the PEAS generation algorithms. As such,
we can see the number of conditions specified in a given pp
as a dimension to measure pp complexity. In view of this, we
generated two sets of privacy preferences with two different lev-
els of complexity. In particular, privacy preferences in the first
set, named Simple PP, have been defined as very simple prefer-
ences with a unique condition on the intended purpose field, and
thus their compliance verification is easy to be performed. In
contrast, privacy preferences in the second set, named Full PP,
have been defined with a condition on each field (i.e., ip, jac,
cdc), so as to make harder the compliance verification. More
precisely, privacy preferences have been defined in such a way
that their constraints for both Simple PP and Full PP refer to
random elements of the data category and purpose trees, which,
in turn, have been populated with synthetic data. In particular,
we have considered 100 elements in both the data category and
the purpose trees. This test case has been applied to all experi-
ment scenarios, as described in the following.
Processor SO I: since FRDM is an hard-coded device with
limited capabilities, we assumed that with each attribute in the
synthetic dataset the same privacy preference is associated (i.e.,
every attribute has the same pp value). This corresponds to a
scenario where the implemented processor SO I receives as in-
put a flow of data generated by a sensing SO owned by a single
user, as such all data are marked with the same privacy prefer-
ence. However, to test how complexity of privacy preferences
impacts the local overhead of processor SO I, we run several
times these experiments, changing in each execution the pri-
vacy preferences associated with attributes, by selecting them
both from Simple PP and Full PP sets.
Processor SO II, Consumer SO, and Smart Object net-
work: differently from processor SOs I, privacy preferences are
dynamically generated and randomly assigned to each attribute
of the tuples entering in the considered smart object.
In performing these experiments we adopt the settings shown
in Table 6, which also presents the execution time of queries
without privacy preferences (i.e., No PP), with simple pri-
vacy preferences (Simple PP), and complex privacy preferences
(Full PP). As expected, simple privacy preferences imply less
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Scenario Settings No Simple Full
PP PP PP
Processor Complex queries 0.31 ms 0.325 ms 0.34 ms
SO I
Processor Complex queries,
SO II 10 sensing SOs 3 ms 3.10 ms 3.28 ms
100% assoc. PP
Complex queries,
Consumer SO 10 sensing SOs ∅ 0.08 ms 0.34 ms
100% assoc. PP
SO network Complex queries 10 ms 10.74 ms 10.99 ms
Table 6: Overhead by varying PP complexity
time to execute the compliance verification. However, even
with complex privacy preferences the overhead is always un-
der 1ms and performance overhead is always less than 10% for
every scenario.
5.2.3. Varying the number of sensing SOs
We expect that increasing the number of tuples to be pro-
cessed will increase the overhead, as it increases the number
of privacy preferences to be elaborated by PEAS update algo-
rithms and the number of attributes to be checked for their com-
pliance by consumer SO.
More precisely, in both scenarios, we varied the number of
nodes in IoT-Lab testbed (i.e., number of sensing SOs) from 1
to 10, as we assume this range is reasonable for scenarios like
the smart home. In performing these experiments, we executed
the queries in the Complex Queries set, described in Section
5.2.1, and we associate with each sensing SO a privacy pref-
erence taken from the Full PP set. Results of experiments are
illustrated in Figure 6 for processor SO II, and in Figure 7 for
consumer SO scenarios.
Figure 6: Varying the number of sensing SOs in Processor SO II scenario
Figure 7: Varying the number of sensing SOs in Consumer SO scenario
As expected, for both scenarios having more nodes in the sys-
tem takes more time to process. 13 For processor SO II, even
in the worst case where we have 10 sensing SOs, overhead is
under 0.7ms, thus performance overhead is less than 9%. Com-
pliance check performed by consumer SOs always takes less
than 0.7 ms.
6. Related Work
In recent years, security and privacy in the IoT domain
have been deeply investigated, with the results that various ap-
proaches have been proposed for dealing with different aspects
of security as well as of privacy. In this section, we provide an
overview of those proposals that are more related to the pro-
posed framework. In particular, we focus on those approaches
that enforce, in some ways, users’ privacy. However, we also
have to note that literature offers several interesting proposals
that, like our framework, deal with the problem of decentral-
ized policy enforcement. All these efforts have been done in do-
mains different from IoT, but they deserve to be cited and com-
pared to our solution. In the following, we summarize works in
these two directions.
6.1. Enforcement of users’ privacy in the IoT domain
So far different access control models have been exploited in
the IoT domain: role based access control (RBAC) (e.g., [4],
[18]); capability based access control (CapBAC) (e.g., [2]); at-
tribute based access control (ABAC) (e.g., [3], [19]), and access
control models based on semantic rules (e.g., [20]). Although
these proposals are instrumental to control how users’ personal
data are used, and thus, in some sense, to protect users’ privacy,
they do not make users able to provide their own preferences
on how their data have to be used and distributed. In contrast,
our proposal makes user able to have a full control on how data
have to be processed (e.g., accessed, aggregated, released).
User’s privacy preferences have been considered in [21],
which proposes a framework avoiding inference of personal
data due to data fusion. Users specify their privacy preferences
in terms of a level of confidentiality associated with each data.
13We note that, we have performed similar experiments by varying the per-
centage of sensing SOs with an associated privacy preferences, and we have
observed same overhead trends.
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The proposed framework consists of a central unit, called Per-
sonal Data Manager (PDM), that manages personal data col-
lected by different devices, playing thus the role of a gateway
between users and third party applications. A further mod-
ule, called Adaptive Interface Discovery Service (AID-S), com-
putes the risk of inference associated with a data disclosure, via
probabilistic models and learning algorithms (e.g., RST, KNN,
Bayes Filter, HMM etc.). Based on this risk value, AID-S rec-
ommends optimal privacy settings to users to reduce the privacy
risks. Similar to our proposal, also this approach considers
user’s perspective, but only in stating the confidentiality level
of personal data, whereas our privacy model considers several
dimensions of a privacy preference. Additionally, we enforce
privacy of the user against data inferences in a decentralized
setting, being able to pose more limitations on possible data
fusions.
Compliance of user’s privacy preferences with third party’s
privacy policies have been considered in [22]. Here, it has been
proposed an application for mobile phones that supports cus-
tomers in making privacy decisions. Privacy preferences are
automatically generated according to the result of a question-
naire filled by users. The application informs the user whether
his/her privacy preferences complies with the corporate’s pri-
vacy policies. In contrast, we handle privacy in a bigger ap-
plication scenario, that is, we enforce user privacy preferences
in a decentralized IoT scenario, where different smart objects
may apply their own queries over data and other parties may
get involved in data processing.
Similar to our approach, other proposals have targeted smart
environments (e.g., smart home and smart city systems) with
the aim of protecting users’ privacy. In [23], authors address the
security and privacy problems of IoT smart home at the network
level, that is, by monitoring network activities of IoT devices to
detect suspicious behaviors. An external entity, called Security
Management Provider (SMP) has been proposed. SMP can add
access control rules to protect specific IoT devices or can apply
dynamic policies to change access control rules depending on
the context (e.g., the family members being present or absent
from the house). This proposals aims at protecting privacy of
the user by limiting access on data through an external entity,
i.e., SMP, with the use of context information. In contrast, in
our approach, we enforce user-defined privacy preferences to
protect users’ privacy in a decentralized scenario.
In [24], a two layered architecture is proposed for protect-
ing users’ privacy in smart city applications. A trusted layer
is designed to store real identities of individuals that can be
processed only by the platform’s components, without disclos-
ing the identities to the outside world. In contrast, an un-
trusted second layer only makes generic, unidentifiable and
identity-independent information available to external applica-
tions. Even if this proposal protects personal data, this is en-
forced only inside the trusted layer, without considering future
operations that may be done on the released data to infer new
sensitive information. Moreover, users are not able to set and
enforce their own privacy preferences.
6.2. Decentralized policy enforcement
A notable example of decentralized privacy management is
represented by the sticky policy approach [25]. According
to this approach user privacy preferences are strictly associ-
ated (sticky) with users’ data. [25] describes the core mecha-
nisms required for managing sticky policies, along with Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and encryption methodologies to at-
tach sticky policies with data as well as to enforce them. [26]
presents a distributed enforcement approach for sticky policies
that permits data to be disseminated across heterogeneous hard-
ware and software environments without pre-existing trust rela-
tionships. Also, [27] presents a sticky policy approach to man-
age the access to IoT resources by allowing users to set and
manage access control policies on their own data. In this ap-
proach, sticky policies allow to define: owner of the data; pur-
poses for which the data can be used; a timestamp that points
out the validity; and constraints which represent the rules for
filtering the data with obligations and restrictions.
Our solution has some similarities with the sticky policy ap-
proach, as we share the same goal, that is, decentralized en-
forcement of user privacy preferences. However, in our pro-
posal we go beyond the traditional privacy preference model,
where constrains are posed mainly on purpose, retention time,
and third party usage by proposing a mechanism to derive pri-
vacy preferences for newly generated data.
Additionally, sticky policy approaches use encryption mech-
anisms to enhance privacy, whereas in our approach encryp-
tion is just used to secure communication. Indeed, encryption
mechanisms add extra level of complexity and demand higher
resources from the devices. However, we have to note that cryp-
tographic solutions have been often used to enforce distributed
access control in several domains, like online social networks
(e.g., [28, 29]), or cloud infrastructure (e.g., [30, 31]). In the
following we focus on efforts done in wireless sensor networks,
as these are more relevant for the IoT domain. For instance, [32]
presents a distributed privacy preserving access control scheme
designed for network of sensor nodes owned by different users,
connected via a network, and managed via an offline certificate
authority. In the proposed scheme, access control is regulated
exploiting tokens that users have to pre-buy from the network
owner before entering the sensor network. Users can query sen-
sor data with unspent tokens and sensor nodes are subject to
validate the token and grant appropriate amount of requested
data. The scheme makes use of blind signatures in token gener-
ation, which ensures that tokens are publicly verifiable yet they
are unlikable to user identities. Similarly to the previous cited
work, [5] presents a distributed protocol for achieving privacy-
preserving access control for sensor networks by exploiting a
ring signature scheme. To query sensor nodes, a user needs to
build a ring signature along with the query command and send
them together to sensor nodes. However such approaches do
not consider privacy preferences of the data owner.
Since one of the features of the proposed framework is to
derive privacy preferences for new data, we have to note that
literature offers also works dealing with composition of hetero-
geneous access control policies. These have been done with the
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goal of composing a set of access control policies into a single
one [33, 34]. For instance, [33] proposes a semantic frame-
work for policy composition without committing to a specific
access control model. Access control policies are modelled as
four valued predicates. Similarly, [34] proposes an algebra for
constructing security policy from different policies.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a decentralized privacy enforce-
ment mechanism for IoT, where compliance check of user in-
dividual privacy preferences is performed directly by smart ob-
jects. The experimental evaluation has shown a negligible time
and bandwidth overhead.
We plan to extend our proposal according to several direc-
tions. We recall that the proposed decentralized privacy en-
forcement mechanism assumes the existence of a set of "deriva-
tion paths", that is, a set of inference rules able to predict the
data category resulting from the execution of an operator. As a
first future work, we aim at investigating how to derive these
rules. At this purpose, we plan to exploit existing data fu-
sion schemes proposed for IoT domain [35, 36], where different
methodologies have been designed (e.g., probability based, arti-
ficial intelligence based) aiming at combining data from multi-
ple sensors to produce more accurate, more complete, and more
dependable information that could not be possible to achieve
through a single sensor. These methods could be deployed in
our framework to model the data flow, and thus derivation paths.
Specifically, multi-dimensional data fusion algorithms, such as
[36, 35], could be used to extract association rules from data
generated by subnet of sensing SOs. Second, we plan to imple-
ment a hybrid approach for compliance check, that combines
apriori and aposteriori compliance verification, to decrease the
performance overhead of the system.
We also plan to improve usability of the system. Indeed, we
are aware that an average user of an IoT application may not
be skilled enough to understand potential privacy threats and
to properly set up his/her privacy preferences. At this purpose,
we plan to investigate tools to help users in setting their privacy
preferences, based on learning from their habits, as it has been
previously done in other domains (e.g., Online Social Networks
[37]).
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